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This paper investigates how family ownership, control and management influence market 
reaction to M&A, both under different economic conditions and under distinct institutional 
backgrounds. Using a database of 381 acquisitions, performed by firms from 11 European and 
North American countries between 2005-2015, I conclude, through univariate and multivariate 
analyses, that family firm resilience is not observed in M&A, with acquisitions being perceived 
as opportunistic in bad times. On the contrary, I observe that family firms significantly 
outperform their non-family peers in good times and that shareholder protection is a key 










Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are integral components of corporate strategy. Companies 
often engage in deals with a common goal – to increase shareholder wealth. However, in 
practice, acquiring firms do not necessarily create value with M&A transactions (Jensen and 
Ruback 1983) and there is even evidence of acquiror value destruction in the period around 
announcement date (Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford 2001).  
Such results can be partly explained by the underlying motivation for M&A. Literature suggests 
that firms pursue transactions based on different factors, namely capturing synergies to increase 
market power (Seth, Song and Pettit 2002), equity overvaluation of the acquiring firm (Shleifer 
and Vishny 2001), managerial hubris (Roll 1986), etc. Other important aspect is the propensity 
to engage in negotiations. Industry characteristics naturally influence M&A propensity. On the 
other hand, ownership structure, and, more specifically, family control also have a significant 
impact on both the probability of pursuing takeovers and on their respective success.  
Family firms are substantially different from non-family firms, either in strategic orientation or 
in terms of value and performance. According to Berrone, et al. (2012), socioemotional wealth 
(SEW) plays a major role in family businesses (FB). In fact, in FB exist duality of goals, 
meaning that not only financial goals matter, but also non-financial goals like continuity, 
reputation and influence are relevant for family shareholders. SEW denotes the benefits that 
family members extract from these non-economic aspects. Then, family owners are SEW-loss 
averse rather than only risk-averse, framing actions in terms of how they will impact SEW 
(Gomez-Mejia, et al. 2011). Therefore, FB valuation results from the combination of the 
explicit financial value with the socioemotional value entrenched in the SEW.  
Several other theories (e.g. agency theory, stewardship theory, resource-based view of a 
company) reinforce the contrast between family and non-family firm performance. Hence, and 
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given the contribution of M&A to the overall performance of the firm, one can expect M&A 
value creation to be significantly different between family and non-family firms. Taking this 
into account, some authors have investigated the relationship between these two variables. Ben-
Amar and André (2006) studied M&A performance of Canadian FB between 1998 and 2002. 
Bouzgarrou and Navatte (2013) investigated the role of family control in acquisitions of French 
firms between 1997 and 2006. Feito-Ruiz and Menendez-Requejo (2010) and Caprio, et al. 
(2011) developed similar studies for the periods 2002-2004 and 1998-2008, but focusing in 
large European countries, rather than in a single geography. Unfortunately, there is a lack of 
consensus in the literature (Worek 2017), with findings ranging from FB outperforming their 
non-FB counterparts to evidence of value destruction when FB acquire other firms. One 
possible explanation for the issue might be the definition of FB employed by authors. As 
suggested by Villalonga and Amit (2006), value discount or premium is influenced by the way 
researchers incorporate family ownership, control and management into the notion of FB.  
Note as well that, to evaluate the impact of ownership on acquiror performance, most authors 
elected to control, mainly, for transaction and firm-wide characteristics. With the exception of 
the investigations conducted by Ben-Amar and André (2006) and Feito-Ruiz and Menendez-
Requejo (2010), research tended to ignore the impact of external conditions on FB performance 
in M&A. Furthermore, researchers mostly evaluated performance with the commonly accepted 
short-term event study methodology. However, as Zollo and Meier (2007) point out, short-term 
performance does not accurately reflect creation of economic value. Instead, it corresponds to 
the “collective bet” of the market at the moment of the announcement of the deal.  
Considering this, it makes sense to develop a new methodology which does not exclusively rely 
on transaction and firm specificities, but that also accounts for the impact of easily identifiable 
factors, external to deals, such as economic conditions and institutional quality within a country. 
This is precisely the purpose of my study: to examine how economic cycles and the mechanisms 
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associated to distinct legal systems shape the market reaction to the announcement of 
acquisitions by family-controlled firms vis-à-vis non-family firms.  
In addition to this, I observed that comparable studies tend to focus on M&A that occurred 
before the 2008 financial crisis. Researchers systematically ignored adverse economic 
conditions to study M&A activity of FB in normal times. Thus, I provide a fresh take on the 
literature by studying acquisitions that were announced between 2005 and 2015, either in large 
European countries or in North America. This way, I am able to test if family firms earn positive 
and significant abnormal returns with acquisitions and if, in fact, FB are more resilient than 
non-FB, as suggested by Kachaner, et al. (2012). 
Hence, using a sample of 381 deals performed by acquirors of 11 countries, I concluded that, 
on average, acquisitions produced a positive ex-ante market reaction. Furthermore, I found that 
whereas in economic downturns FB significantly underperform against non-FB, and even 
destroy short-term value, in good times family firm shareholders tend to earn positive and 
significant returns, higher than those generated by non-FB. Finally, I found evidence that the 
institutional framework significantly influences market reaction to M&A, as, in fact, there is a 
positive relation between the level of shareholder protection and acquiring firm returns. 
That being said, this paper is organised in the following way. In section 2, I review the relevant 
literature and define the hypotheses of the study. In section 3, I describe the methodology and 
justify the choice of variables. Then, in section 4, I present and analyse results and lastly, in 
section 5, I provide a conclusion, discuss limitations and offer suggestions for future research. 
2. Literature Review 
(i) FB vs Non-FB firm performance 
Over the years, many theories were developed to explain the differences between family and 
non-family firms. One of the earliest and more successful is the three-circle model, proposed 
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by Davis and Tagiuri (1989). The authors suggest that the behaviour of family firms results 
from the interaction between agents that have different stances regarding to family, ownership 
and management – with the three systems being independent but overlapping. Hence, it is the 
overlap between systems and the existence of blurred boundaries that can lead to either a better 
global performance of FB or, instead, to underperformance against non-FB. 
Note that, on one hand, researchers found evidence of higher performance associated with 
family ownership (Anderson and Reeb 2003). James (1999) defended that the long-term 
orientation of FB, which takes into consideration continuity, family ties, loyalty, insurance and 
stability, reduces the agency costs that arise when ownership and control are divided. Moreover, 
SEW preservation combined with the unique set of resources that result from the family 
involvement in the firm – “familiness” (Habbershon and Williams 1999) – help to explain the 
“competitive advantage” of FB. 
On the other hand, researchers also found contradictory evidence concerning FB and agency 
costs. Instead of a theoretically natural alignment between managers and owners that minimizes 
agency costs, empirical studies discovered that factors such as adverse selection, executive 
entrenchment and goal incongruity undermine FB performance. For example, Claessens, et al. 
(2002) found that the entrenchment effect in FB, which implies the pursuit of private benefits 
by family owners to the detriment of minority shareholders, increases with the level of control 
and is responsible for destroying firm value. Additionally, Johnson, et al. (2000) indicated 
tunneling as another factor responsible for lower FB performance. 
Looking now to M&A, findings are once again non-consensual for FB. The same arguments 
used in favor of better or worse FB performance are also used to explain M&A results. Feito-
Ruiz and Menendez-Requejo (2010) coined the terms “family firm efficiency” and “family firm 
opportunism” to describe the two positions. Given this, I aim to test the following hypotheses: 
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H 1.1: Family firms generate a positive market reaction when they acquire other businesses. 
H 1.2: FB significantly outperform their non-family peers when engaging in acquisitions. 
(ii) Good times vs Bad times 
Andrade, et al. (2001) suggest that mergers occur in waves, and that they tend to cluster by 
industry within the same wave. The authors elaborate that differences in M&A activity between 
industries can be attributed to industry-level shocks. These shocks have an unexpected nature 
and can range from technological innovations to deregulation and economic shocks. One 
example is the 1970s oil price shocks that served as a lever for the 1980s M&A wave. Then, 
large economic shocks create imbalances, which will be explored through M&A.  
In this study, I evaluate the impact of two concrete shocks: the 2008 financial crisis, with an 
immediate impact over the US economy and a lagged effect over European economies, and the 
European sovereign debt crisis, with its ramifications especially in Mediterranean countries. 
Existing literature suggests that the 2008 global financial crisis negatively affected both the 
number of transactions and deal values (Reddy, Nangia and Agrawal 2014). Regarding to value 
creation, Rao-Nicholson and Salaber (2014) noted that short-term performance of acquirors was 
significantly higher in the post-crisis (bad times) than before the shock (good times). The 
authors attributed such results to a combination of factors that predominate in periods after 
crises, particularly, target firm devaluation and stock market crash, that reduce the purchase 
price (Wan and Yiu 2009), and more objective and accelerated corporate agendas, that envision 
quick restructurings and, hence, reduce agency costs and increase acquiror return (Campello, 
Graham and Harvey 2010). So, I will test Rao-Nicholson and Salaber findings that: 
H 2.1: Firms are more efficient at exploring market imperfections through M&A in bad times.  
Considering now the presence of family control, literature suggests that FB should have a more 
robust performance than non-FB during crisis. Kachaner, et al. (2012) found that family firms 
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outperformed their non-family peers in recessions, even though the same might not hold for 
good times. The researchers found that, across business cycles from 1997-2009, average long-
term financial performance was superior for FB, illustrating that FB strategy is centred more 
around resilience rather than performance. Given so, I will test if the same contrast between FB 
and non-FB during economic downturns also holds when analysing M&A performance: 
H 2.2: In bad times, FB acquirors outperform non-FB acquirors. 
(iii) Impact of the Legal System and Institutional Framework 
In their 1998 study, La Porta, et al. (1998) argued that the value of securities is intrinsically 
connected to the legal rules of the correspondent jurisdiction where they are issued. The authors 
suggested, likewise, that Law and its enforcement are key determinants of the protection 
mechanisms that creditors and shareholders have in each country. 
Taking this into consideration, the authors proceeded to identify the differences in legal rules 
between countries and found that these can be organized according to their legal family in 
Common Law (English-origin) and Civil Law countries. Civil Law countries could be further 
divided in three subsets, based on their respective origins, as: German-civil-law, French-civil-
law and Scandinavian-civil-law countries. La Porta, et al. (1998) then concluded that Common 
Law rules provide stronger legal rights to investors than civil laws, and that, within Civil Law, 
French-civil-law countries are the ones with the weakest shareholder and creditor protections.  
Furthermore, the study also highlighted the negative relation between the degree of 
concentration of ownership in a firm and the level of investor protection, suggesting that the 
influence of minority shareholders in firm-wide decision making tends to be irrelevant in 
countries that do not offer appropriate protection. Under such conditions, family shareholders 
that hold the control of the business have increased incentives to pursuit private benefits. This 
is consistent with the “family firm opportunism” hypothesis proposed by Feito-Ruiz and 
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Menendez-Requejo (2010). Therefore, with H 3.1, I will test if, in countries with weak investor 
protection, FB use M&A to create value or, instead, to satisfy family owners’ desires.  
H 3.1: Family-controlled firms from countries with weak shareholder protection destroy value 
when they acquire other firms and are outperformed by non-FB acquirors. 
Conversely, if the latter does not hold, I am interested in assessing if the better performance of 
FB described by Anderson and Reeb (2003) also extends to M&A, independently of the quality 
of the legal system of the country of origin of the family firm – hypothesis H 3.2. 
3. Data and Methodology 
(i) Sample Selection 
The data set used in this study consists of M&A events in which the acquiring firm is publicly 
listed in at least one of a group of 11 countries (9 European countries, USA and Canada). M&A 
data was extracted from the Thomson Reuters’ SDC Platinum Mergers & Acquisitions 
Database, whereas historical stock performance was obtained from the Bloomberg database.  
The sample selection process was based on the following criteria: (i) only deals that were 
announced between 2005 and 2015 are considered; (ii) deals correspond exclusively to 
acquisitions of majority interest – ignoring mergers and other operations allows to control for 
the entry of new shareholders that can disrupt family continuity and dynamics; (iii) deal status 
must be completed and companies that engage in several deals are included; (iv) only acquirors 
with market value greater than USD 250 million are considered; (v) transaction value must be 
available and greater than USD 10 million, otherwise the deal is disregarded; (vi) only non-
financial acquirors were considered. The final sample comprises 381 deals, worth USD 74.5 





(a) Dependent Variable 
Over the last decades, researchers used different methods to assess the impact of M&A on 
corporate performance. Schoenberg (2006) categorized studies according to four main 
measures: i) cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), ii) managers’ assessments, iii) divestment 
data and iv) expert informants’ assessments. Traditionally, researchers favoured event studies 
(Zollo and Meier 2007). However, within event studies, there is a large contrast between short- 
and long-term windows, as authors discovered that measuring performance in different 
horizons can lead to opposite outcomes. Zollo and Meier (2007) then referred to this dichotomy 
as the distinction between ex-ante market expectations and the ex-post realization – with the 
latter being a product of the knowledge that has formed throughout the integration process.  
Andrade, et al. (2001) suggest that, ideally, in an efficient capital market, stock prices should 
adjust very rapidly to an unexpected event, thus, incorporating the changes in expected value 
from the acquisition announcement. Nonetheless, in practice, ex-ante returns rely on a limited 
set of information, which precludes important aspects that may affect long-term realization of 
value (Zollo and Meier 2007). Hence, researchers found evidence of negative long-term returns, 
that rectify positive ex-ante returns – illustrating the failure to measure the economic impact of 
complex strategic choices with short-term windows (Oler, Harrison and Allen 2008).  Despite 
these concerns, ultimately, I opted for a short-term event study approach. Such methodology 
allows me to control for the presence of high-magnitude and prolonged economic shocks within 
the sample. Moreover, longer horizons include other events besides the acquisition, making it 
difficult to isolate the share of returns attributable to the event of reference. 
Given this, I used the commonly accepted methodology proposed by Brown and Warner (1985) 
to detect abnormal performance at announcement. Following the authors, I used samples of 250 
daily return observations, one for each stock, starting at 244 days before the announcement  
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(-244) and ending 5 days after the announcement (+5). Similar to Brown and Warner, the 
considered estimation period is (-244,-6). However, for the event period, I tested several CARs, 
constructed with different windows, to attain the one that better reflects the “collective bet” of 
the market (Zollo and Meier 2007). Note that for daily data, Brown and Warner propose three 
alternatives to estimate CARs: i) mean-adjusted returns, ii) market-adjusted returns and iii) OLS 
market model. In general, the three methods yield similar results, but the OLS tends to perform 
better, as highlighted by Dyckman, et al. (1984).  CARs were then computed with the formula: 
(1)          𝐶𝐴𝑅 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼?̂? + 𝛽?̂?𝑅𝑚,𝑡) 
In equation (1), 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 represents the realized return for security i at day t and 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 denotes the 
market return at day t. Coefficients 𝛼?̂? and 𝛽?̂? correspond to the OLS estimators for the period 
(-244,-6). One final remark has to do with the choice of the market index. Instead of adopting 
a generalized index (e.g. MSCI World Index), I used a domestic benchmark for each stock. Note 
that, between 2005-2015, systematic risk was significantly different across countries, 
especially, during economic downturns. Therefore, by adjusting returns for countrywide risk 
with domestic benchmarks, I am able to estimate CARs with higher precision and, 
simultaneously, reduce the need for additional control variables. 
(b) Independent Variables 
Family Business (FB) 
FB is a dummy variable that accounts for family control and management within a firm. Note 
that authors often disagree on the extent of the FB definition. Bouzgarrou and Navatte (2013) 
consider that a firm is a FB when the family controls more than 51% of the voting rights or its 
voting rights are more than the double of the next largest shareholder. Alternatively, André and 
Ben-Amar (2014) consider 10% as the minimum threshold for family control. Despite that, 
researchers commonly overweigh ownership and tend to ignore that, in several cases, families 
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are not actively engaged in management. Hence, I used a more conservative approach to define 
FB, consistent with three-circle model: a FB is a synthesis of ownership control and strategic 
influence in management by family members, that are concerned with family relationships and 
value continuity across generations (Poza 2010). 
Good Times (GOODTIMES) 
I defined Good Times as a variable representative of periods of economic expansion. Good 
Times is a dummy variable that takes the value 0 when the domestic economy is in a recessive 
cycle (bad times) and 1 otherwise. Good Times is positively correlated with GDP growth. 
However, the variable is less restrictive than GDP growth as, in fact, a cycle of contraction does 
not correspond exclusively to the year of decline in production. Usually, it includes following 
months or years, as consumer and market confidence respond slowly to high magnitude crises.  
English, French, German, Scandinavian (ENGLISH, FRENCH, GERMAN, SCANDINAVIAN) 
The four variables are dummies aimed at studying the impact of different institutional 
backgrounds on the market reaction to M&A. Each variable denotes the origin of the legal 
system of the country where the acquiring firm is based. Countries were grouped following the 
methodology proposed by La Porta, et al. (1998). Hence, English denotes Common Law 
countries and includes Canada, the UK and the USA. The other three correspond to Civil Law 
based legal systems. Scandinavian includes Norway and Sweden. German comprises Germany 
and Switzerland, and, lastly, French includes France, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. 
Accounting Standards (ACCOUNTSTAND)  
Accounting Standards corresponds to the index constructed by La Porta, et al. (1998) that 
measures the quality of accounting practices in each country, based on the information provided 
by companies in their annual reports. Hay, et al. (1996) suggest that law enforcement might be 
severely limited by the lack of quality accounting methods. In fact, the authors defend that weak 
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accounting standards, which coexist with poor institutions, create non-verifiability of future 
states, thus compromising the quality of contracts. Considering this, I decided to use the rating 
of Accounting Standards to measure the quality of the legal enforcement in each country.   
(c) Control Variables  
Deal Value (DV) 
DV controls for the size of the transaction. It serves as a proxy for target firm size, as several 
firms included in the sample are private or subsidiaries of the acquirors, thus not displaying a 
market value. DV is then presented as the logarithm of the reported deal value (in USD million). 
Ratio Deal Value-Acquiring Firm Market Value (RATDVAMV) 
The variable RATDVAMV measures the relative size of deal, in terms of the acquiror market 
value. Literature suggests a positive relation between acquiring firm return and target size, 
implying that larger targets generate greater returns (Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller 2002) 
(Jarrell and Poulsen 1989). Therefore, acknowledging the positive correlation between deal and 
target size, I expect RATDVAMV to impact positively acquiring firm returns. 
Target Status – Listed (TPUBLIC) 
Fuller, et al. (2002) analysed shareholder returns for companies that consistently engage in 
acquisitions and found evidence of bidder value destruction when public targets are acquired. 
Evidence that acquisitions of private targets generate gains for acquiring firm shareholders is 
corroborated by Chang (1998) and Conn, et al. (2005). Considering this, I created a control 
variable – TPUBLIC – which takes the value 1 if the target is publicly listed and 0 otherwise. 
Cross-Border (CROSSBORDER)  
Cross-Border is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the bidder acquires a foreign 
target and 0 when the acquisition occurs within the same country. Overall, cross-border 
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acquisitions tend to generate positive returns. However, there is not consensus on the magnitude 
of returns. Conn, et al. (2005) found that, for UK firms, cross-border acquisitions generated 
lower announcement-period and long-run returns. Conversely, other studies found evidence of 
higher CARs associated with cross-border acquisitions (Faccio, McConnell and Stolin 2006). 
4. Results and Discussion 
(i) Sample Description 
From 2005 to 2015, the 303 firms comprised in the sample were responsible for spending more 
than USD 74 billion in acquisitions of majority interest, accounting for an average transaction 
value of USD 195.6 million (Table 1). Note, however, that the mean value and the number of 
transactions did not distribute equally over time. In fact, there is a USD 57.7 million gap 
between the minimum (2010) and the maximum (2015) average annual deal values. 
Furthermore, whereas in 2007 there are 58 observed transactions, in 2015 only 19 deals were 
registered. Then, an important conclusion from Table 1 is that years with  simultaneously lower 
total expenditure and weaker M&A activity generally coincided with economic downturns. 
This is consistent with Reddy, et al. (2014) findings for the 2008 financial crisis.  
Considering now the separation between FB and non-FB, only 87 of the deals contained in the 
sample (23%) were performed by family-controlled firms. This reduced number of deals is 
consistent with the lower propensity of FB to make acquisitions, as reported by Caprio, et al. 
(2011). Family firms are not exclusively profit- and results-driven. Instead, they value 
employee and customer loyalty, stability and continuity across generations (James 1999), which 
mitigate the ambition to grow faster and inorganically through M&A. 
(ii) Event Study 
The first step in this study was to estimate CARs and assess their validity. Following a simple 
OLS market model, I obtained the expected returns, and then computed excess returns as the 
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difference between realized and expected return (Equation 1). The output consisted of 381 
samples, one for each deal, of 250 daily excess returns.  
To verify the properties of the distributions of excess returns in the estimation window, Brown 
and Warner (1985) propose two methods to aggregate the data. On one hand, the authors 
suggest using the mean value of 381 test statistics, while on the other, they propose using a full 
sample of 239 average daily excess returns and to derive the results from this distribution. Note 
that, for the first case, the average standard deviation is 0.01718, much above 0.00097, obtained 
with the second method. Furthermore, the first construct yields an average kurtosis of 6.69 in 
excess of a normal distribution, whereas with the second method the distribution of excess 
returns approximates to a normal distribution (Table 4). Additionally, the skewness coefficient 
is less pronounced for the second case as well (-0.17 vs 0.30). These results are consistent with 
the Central Limit Theorem, as, in fact, using cross-sectional mean excess returns reduces 
deviations to normality. Similarly to Brown and Warner (1985), I assumed cross-sectional 
independence between daily returns. So, considering this, I based my analyses on the 
distribution of the daily 250 mean excess returns.  
Besides the possibility of non-normality (excluded), Brown and Warner (1985) indicated other 
factors that could affect estimation and inference of CARs. First, the authors suggested that 
non-synchronous trading might influence parameter estimation, specifically creating serial 
dependence between observations and making estimators biased and inconsistent. Note that 
non-synchronous trading is related with the trading frequency of the security. Hence, using only 
stocks of public and relatively large companies (market cap > USD 250 million) allows to 
control for the presence of downward bias in β estimates of less frequently traded stocks. 
Moreover, Brown and Warner found that not acknowledging non-synchronous trading does not 
create misspecifications of the OLS market model for this type of studies.  
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Other issue pointed by Brown and Warner (1985) was serial autocorrelation. Whereas 
autocorrelation does not impact unbiasedness and consistency, it affects efficiency of the β 
estimator and, consequently, any inference. Given so, I ran Durbin-Watson (DW) tests for each 
of the 381 samples of daily expected returns, with each sample corresponding to a stock. At the 
1% significance level, the critical values for the test are dL=1.664 and dU=1.684, meaning that 
if the DW statistic is above the dU threshold I do not reject the null hypothesis H0: no serial 
autocorrelation. Then, from the 381 individual stock samples, I rejected H0 for only 5 stocks 
and the DW statistic fell in the uncertainty interval (between dL and dU) for 1 stock. The mean 
DW statistic of the 381 stocks was 2.06. Thus, I found no evidence that error terms were, in 
general, linearly dependent on the previous period error term. Therefore, I found no need to 
correct estimators neither for non-synchronous trading nor for serial autocorrelation. 
After acknowledging possible problems with the estimation, I, then, proceeded to analyse 
results. At this point, event study inference centred in evaluating whether abnormal returns 
around announcement date were statistically significant or not. For this purpose, Brown and 
Warner  proposed the application of a simple t-statistic aimed at rejecting the null hypothesis 
H0: no abnormal performance in the event period. The t-stat was computed as the ratio between 
the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) and the estimated daily standard deviation. 
Results for the overall sample are detailed in Table 5. Note that there is no clear indication in 
the literature that one short-term window is better at capturing abnormal performance than 
another. Hence, I analysed significance for several ranges, some centred around t=0 
(announcement day), and others rather capturing pre-event performance, e.g. (-10,+1).  
In general, I found evidence that shareholders of acquiring firms earn positive and significant 
(at the 1% level) abnormal returns with the announcement of the acquisition. The only 
exceptions were the windows (-20,+1) and (-20,+5), whose returns despite positive were 
insignificant. More specifically, I found that market reaction was, on average, 0.42% upon 
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announcement, between 2005 and 2015 (Table 5). This evidence corroborates the hypothesis 
of short-term shareholder value creation by acquiring firms, demonstrated by the findings of 
Faccio, et al. (2006) and Moeller, et al. (2004). Additionally, I found that cumulative 
performance more than doubled if the window expands to include 1 day, 2 days or 5 days before 
and after the announcement date (Table 5). However, despite cumulative performance 
increasing with the number of days of the event window, CAARs were higher for shorter 
windows centred around t=0 (e.g. 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡=0 = 0.42%, 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(−1,+1) = 0.30%, whereas 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(−5,+5) = 0.08% and 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(−20,+1) = 0.03%). Note that CAARs were also more 
significant in these windows, as illustrated by t-stats (𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑡=0 = 4.25, 𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡(−1,+1) =
5.38 vs. 𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡(−5,+5) = 2.74 and 𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡(−10,+1) = 2.68). Hence, I decided to focus in the 
cumulative performance measure for the period (-1,+1) – later referred to as 3-day CAR. The 
fact that comparable studies used the same measure of ex-ante returns also weighed in the 
choice of the 3-day CAR as the dependent variable for my multivariate analysis. 
(iii) Family Control and Acquiring Firm Performance 
After separating firms according to family ownership and control, I noticed that the positive ex-
ante market reaction persisted when FB announced acquisitions of majority interest. Between 
2005 and 2015, family firm shareholders earned, on average, 0.76% and 0.87%, on a cumulative 
basis, in the 3-day and 5-day windows centred around t=0, respectively (Table 6). Such results 
validate the hypothesis H 1.1 and are, therefore, aligned with the findings of shareholder value 
creation for FB acquirors reported by Ben-Amar and André (2006) for Canadian family firms 
(3-day CAR = 2.1%), by Bouzgarrou, and Navatte. (2013) for French FB (3-day CAR = 1.01%) 
and by Feito-Ruiz and Menendez-Requejo (2010) for European FB (CAAR = 1.38%). 
Nonetheless, I observed that the market reaction was mostly flat at announcement date for FB 
(𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡=0 = 0.02%) and that the short-term value gained with the acquisition tended to 
disappear as the length of the cumulative performance window increased (Table 6). Hence, 
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despite positive, CARs tended to be insignificant for most windows. Exceptions were (-1,+1) 
and (-2,+2) CARs, which materialized as significant at the 95% and 90% level, respectively. 
Looking now to non-family firms, shareholders earned positive and broadly significant returns 
(at least at the 5% significance level). 3-day CAR totalled 0.96% and shareholders accumulated, 
on average, more than 1% of abnormal return in periods longer than 5 days (exception is the    
(-20,+5) window). Furthermore, non-FB performed significantly better at announcement date 
than FB, generating, on average, 0.51% more return to their shareholders than family firms 
(Table 6). Generally, the ex-ante market reaction to acquisitions was much superior for non-FB 
than for FB. Hence, and despite the difference between CARs not being significant for most 
windows, the obtained results provide strong evidence that FB underperform against non-
family firms. Given so, my results contradict the findings of some comparable studies, that FB 
acquirors significantly outperform their non-family peers. Thus, hypothesis H 1.2 does not 
hold, at least for the whole period 2005-2015. Note that, even though, on average, FB created 
value with acquisitions, underperformance might result from suboptimal investments, as 
suggested by Feito-Ruiz and Menendez-Requejo (2010) or, instead, be the product of different 
market and investor sentiment towards FB-led acquisitions under distinct economic conditions.  
(iv) Family Control and Acquiring Firm Performance under Distinct Economic Conditions 
Literature suggests that economic cycles have a considerable impact on M&A, either in terms 
of the propensity to engage in deals or concerning value creation. Table 7 presents acquiror 
performance metrics under different macroeconomic scenarios: Good Times and Bad Times. 
Overall, performance was positive under both scenarios, meaning that, on average, firms were 
able to generate positive ex-ante returns with acquisitions, regardless of economic conditions.  
First, in Good Times, abnormal return at t=0 reached an average value of 0.45% and it increased 
gradually as the event window expanded (e.g. 𝐶𝐴𝑅(−1,+1) = 0.87%, 𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5,+5) = 1.06%). 
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CARs were significant for most windows and one can conclude, from Table 7, that cumulative 
performance in Good Times was mostly driven by the excess returns obtained in the days 
following the announcement. Then, in Bad Times, the abnormal return at t=0 was slightly 
lower, with an average value of 0.33%. Contrasting with Good Times, asymmetric window 
CARs, that capture mainly pre-event performance, were substantially higher in Bad Times, 
suggesting that pre-announcement performance is an important driver of short-run shareholder 
value during economic downturns. The 3-day CAR was, on average, 1.02%, 14 basis points 
higher than in Good Times. However, the remaining symmetric window CARs, centred around 
t=0, were lower in Bad Times. Despite that, differences between CARs in Good Times and Bad 
Times were not statistically significant in none of the windows, further implying that, with the 
univariate analysis, there is not enough evidence to either support or reject hypothesis H 2.1.  
Tables 8 and 9 present detailed results for Good Times and Bad Times, respectively, with the 
proper separation of firms in FB and non-FB. At this level of disaggregation, there were sharp 
differences between the two types of acquirors.  
In Bad Times, whereas non-FB shareholders earned positive and significant CARs (e.g. 
𝐶𝐴𝑅(−1,+1) = 1.44%), FB acquisitions destroyed shareholder value, illustrated by the negative 
CARs for all short-term windows, e.g. 𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5,+5) = −2.87% (Table 8). Hence, not only non-
FB outperformed significantly FB in Bad Times, but there is also evidence that the market 
reacts negatively to the announcement of acquisitions by FB, suggesting, for example, that it 
expects family owners to extract private benefits from the acquired firm to the detriment of 
other shareholders’ interests, or that, simply, FB overpay for their targets. Therefore, I rejected 
the hypothesis H 2.2 based on the findings of this partial analysis. On the other hand, in Good 
Times, both FB and non-FB shareholders earned positive and vastly significant returns with 
acquisitions (Table 9). On average, under favourable economic conditions, FB even 
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outperformed non-FB (𝐹𝐵 𝐶𝐴𝑅(−1,+1) = 1.19% vs. 𝑁𝑜𝑛 𝐹𝐵 𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5,+5) = 0.78%), possibly 
signalling that the market expects family firm efficiency in M&A to hold in good times.  
(v) Family Control and Acquiring Firm Performance under Different Legal Frameworks 
La Porta, et al. (1998) argued that countries whose legal system is based on Common Law rules 
provide greater shareholder protection. Opposingly, legal systems based on Civil Law offer less 
protection to minority shareholders, thus creating more concentrated ownership structures.  
Tables 10 to 13 present average CARs separated according to the origin of the legal system. 
Looking first to overall M&A performance, I noticed that firms from German-civil-law and 
from Common Law-based countries generated the highest ex-ante returns (significant at the 1% 
level), regardless of the ownership structure (Table 10). Conversely, businesses whose legal 
system had a Scandinavian-civil-law origin, on average, destroyed shareholder value with 
acquisitions (despite the market reacting positively at t=0, with an average AR of 0.30%). 
As far as family firms are concerned (Table 11), FB from German- and English-origin legal 
systems remain the best performers from the four. FB from English legal systems generated, on 
average, 𝐶𝐴𝑅(−1,+1) = 1.27% and 𝐶𝐴𝑅(−2,+2) = 1.76% (both significant at least at the 10% 
level), while German-civil-law FB shareholders earned very large and significant (at 1% level) 
CARs: 𝐶𝐴𝑅(−1,+1) = 3.73%, 𝐶𝐴𝑅(−2,+2) = 4.93% (Table 11). On the other hand, FB from 
both French- (𝐶𝐴𝑅(−2,+2) = −0.42%) and Scandinavian-civil-law (𝐶𝐴𝑅(−2,+2) = −1.91%) 
countries, on average, destroyed shareholder value with acquisitions between 2005 and 2015. 
This evidence is, therefore, consistent with the hypothesis H 3.1, that the market anticipates 
wealth appropriation by the controlling owners of FB in countries with weak shareholder 
protection. Note that in the case of non-FB, acquisitions were met, in general, with considerably 
positive market reactions under all legal environments (Table 12). Hence, when comparing both 
FB and non-FB M&A within each legal system, I concluded that German-civil-law based FB 
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significantly outperformed their non-family peers, while family-controlled firms significantly 
underperformed against non-FB in Scandinavian- and French-civil-law countries (Table 13). 
Consequently, the hypothesis of a competitive advantage that FB have in acquisitions (H 3.2) 
is nullified, suggesting that markets react differently to family control in M&A, according to 
the quality of the institutions, and particularly, to the legal rules in each country. 
(vi) Multivariate Analysis 
To complement my research, I performed a multivariate analysis based on the following model: 
(2)   𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑂𝑂𝐷𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑇𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
The specification (2) includes the variables FB and GOODTIMES to assess, respectively, the 
impact of family control and macroeconomic conditions on CARs. INSTITUTIONS is a 
variable vector that includes three legal system dummies (in this case, I decided to drop 
Scandinavian-civil-law and consider it as the base case for the model) and ACCOUNTSTAND, 
which serves as a proxy for Law enforcement, thus complementing the analysis on the impact 
of the institutional environment. Lastly, Xi is another variable vector, but that controls for 
transaction and target firm characteristics. The vector comprises four variables: DV, 
RATDVAMV, TPUBLIC and CROSSBORDER. Table 14 provides descriptive statistics for 
the variables. Based on the existing literature, I expect ACCOUNTSTAND and RATDVAMV 
to contribute positively to CAR and that, conversely, TPUBLIC has a negative effect on 
acquiring firm return.  
OLS estimates for the regressors are presented in Table 16. Note that there was no evidence of 
multicollinearity between these variables (Table 15). Hence, estimators are unbiased and 
consistent. However, the error term is heteroskedastic, affecting usual inference. In fact, 
whereas I did not observe linear heteroskedasticity through the Breusch-Pagan test 
(𝐹 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐(10,370) = 1.40, only rejected at the 17.99% significance level), I detected non-
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linear forms of heteroskedasticity when performing White’s test. The outcome of the latter was 
a chi-square statistic of 107.65 for 55 degrees of freedom, that led to the rejection of the null 
hypothesis H0: homoskedasticity. Then, I decided to use robust statistics to correct for the issue. 
Moving on, I found that acquirors generate, on average, smaller ex-ante returns in periods of 
normal economic growth, thus validating hypothesis H 2.1. This is consistent with Rao-
Nicholson and Salaber (2014) findings of greater M&A efficiency in Bad Times. Furthermore, 
I found that the larger the deal is in relative size, the greater will be the CAR of the acquiring 
firm, in line with the findings of Fuller, et al. (2002). Additionally, I observed that cross border 
transactions created significantly higher value and that acquisitions of listed targets were met 
with better market response, although not significant (contradicting findings that private targets 
lead to higher acquiror performance). As far as family control is concerned, I found that FB are 
expected to underperform against non-family firms when they engage in acquisitions (Models 
1 and 3). However, notice that the impact of family ownership in the overall performance tends 
to be small and it even reverted when controlling for year fixed effects (Models 2 and 4).  
Regarding to institutional variables, coefficients of ENGLISH, FRENCH & GERMAN are all 
positive and significant, indicating that, ceteris paribus, firms from countries that have legal 
systems with those origins are expected to create higher value with acquisitions than firms from 
Scandinavian-civil-law countries. Moreover, note that, from the three, German-civil-law firms 
are the ones that generate greater CARs, followed by Common Law based countries, when 
controlling for year fixed effects. Such results confirm previous findings that acquiring firms 
from countries with stronger shareholder protection have less incentives to pursue acquisitions 
that satisfy controlling owners’ self-interests but that destroy overall firm value. Furthermore, 
I found evidence of a positive and significant relation between Accounting Standards and CAR. 
Such evidence then corroborates hypothesis H 3.1 and reinforces the idea that Law and 




This study evaluates the impact of the ownership structure, the macroeconomic environment 
and the quality of institutions on M&A performance. Note that in M&A studies, researchers 
tend to agree that target firm shareholders capture most of the synergistic value. However, there 
is lack of consensus regarding to acquirors. Then, I contribute to literature by analysing market 
reaction to different acquiror’s ownership structures, and, particularly, by assessing if investors 
react positively to family control, either in good or in bad times, and under different institutional 
frameworks. Moreover, by focusing on M&A between 2005-2015 in both European and North 
American countries, I complement studies on cross-border M&A as well as during recessions. 
In general, I found that the market reaction to acquisitions was, on average, positive regardless 
of the ownership structure. Second, I found that firms are, largely, more efficient at exploring 
imperfections through M&A in bad times. However, efficiency differs across firms. In fact, I 
found that FB underperform against non-FB (although not significantly), and that this 
underperformance might even translate into value destruction in bad times. Lastly, I concluded 
that legal rules significantly impact returns as, indeed, acquirors from countries with weaker 
shareholder protection generate lower value, and FB acquirors could eventually destroy value. 
Concerning the limitations of the analysis, note that, in the sample construction, I elected to 
study only acquisitions of majority interest of public and relatively large firms. Naturally, this 
implies that the obtained results have a narrow scope. Therefore, future research should, first, 
analyse other types of transactions, namely mergers, and second, look to a more diverse set of 
acquirors, including both smaller-sized and private firms. Other consideration has to do with 
the definition of Family Business. The use of a dummy variable to separate firms according to 
family control is quite restrictive, ignoring differences within FB. Thus, future research should 
further analyse different layers of family control and management. Still regarding to data 
selection, note that I used the indicators proposed by La Porta, et al. (1998). However, these 
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indicators were constructed with 1990s data. Therefore, future studies should also analyse the 
evolution of institutional quality over time and check if the findings of La Porta, et al. (1998) 
still hold today. Additionally, in the multivariate analysis, I did not include interaction terms 
within my model. The decision was motivated by the fact that interacting dummy variables 
would produce multicollinearity, hence, creating biased estimators and invalidating results. 
Then, in the future, with a broader set of independent variables, authors should evaluate 
interactions between them. One final remark is the possibility of endogeneity. Future studies 
should acknowledge that the presence of endogeneity creates inconsistent regressors. This issue 
might affect, for example, institutional variables. One possible solution is using shareholder 
protection mechanisms as instrumental variables instead of just legal system dummy variables, 
which might not accurately represent differences in institutional frameworks. 
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2005 31 6 115.8 197.3 
2006 45 8 389.1 186.4 
2007 56 9 211.5 164.5 
2008 28 5 307.4 189.5 
2009 28 5 771.1 206.1 
2010 38 6 793.7 178.8 
2011 40 9 201.0 230.0 
2012 37 7 158.0 193.5 
2013 21 3 906.1 186.0 
2014 38 8 193.6 215.6 
2015 19 4 486.2 236.1 
Total 381 74 533.5 195.6 
 
Table 2. Sample charact. – Distribution of Transactions by Country of the Acquiring Firm 
Countries 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2005-15 
Canada 2  1 7 3 3 3 3 6 1 6 2 37 
France 6 2 2 6 5 5 4 6 1 3 5 45 
Germany 2 3 6 2 2 3 2 1 1 2 1 25 
Italy 2 4 1 3 2 2 3 0 0 1 1 19 
Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 3 0 5 
Norway 3 3 3 1 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 19 
Spain 1 9 4 1 0 4 3 2 1 2 2 29 
Sweden 3 7 2 3 0 1 5 1 1 1 0 24 
Switzerland 1 2 4 0 1 1 1 1 2 4 0 17 
United 
Kingdom 
1 3 13 5 3 4 8 3 3 6 3 52 
United 
States 
10 11 14 4 11 13 9 14 10 8 5 109 
Total 31 45 56 28 28 38 40 37 21 38 19 381 
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Table 3. Sample characterization – Distribution of Transactions by Macroeconomic Industry 
of the Acquiring Firm 
Macro 
Industries 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2005-15 
Consumer 
Prod. & Serv. 
3 2 3 2 2 4 1 4 2 4 0 27 
Consumer 
Staples 
1 0 3 2 4 5 7 3 1 6 0 32 
Energy and 
Power 
6 5 11 4 6 9 7 10 2 2 6 68 
Healthcare 2 2 5 2 2 3 4 3 7 3 3 36 
High 
Technology 
2 7 10 3 0 2 6 1 3 5 0 39 
Industrials 4 10 9 4 4 3 5 6 2 6 3 56 
Materials 6 4 6 3 6 6 4 5 1 6 2 49 
Media and 
Entertainment 
2 4 5 2 4 4 3 3 3 3 4 37 
Retail 2 3 2 5 0 0 2 2 0 1 0 17 
Telecom. 3 8 2 1 0 2 1 0 0 2 1 20 











Excess Kurtosis Skewness 
(a) 0.00000% 0.000978 -0.05 -0.17 
(b) 0.00000% 0.017185 6.69 0.30 
(a) – Values computed using 239 average daily mean excess return observations 






Table 5. Analysis of the statistical significance of CARs in different short-term windows 
around announcement date (t=0) for all firms comprised in the sample  
Event Period CAR CAAR t-stat 
t=0 0.42% 0.42% 4.25*** 
(-1,+1) 0.91% 0.30% 5.38*** 
(-2,+2) 0.91% 0.18% 4.18*** 
(-5,+5) 0.89% 0.08% 2.74*** 
(-1,0) 0.63% 0.32% 4.57*** 
(-3,0) 0.69% 0.17% 3.54*** 
(-5,0) 0.87% 0.15% 3.64*** 
(-5,1) 1.15% 0.16% 4.44*** 
(-10,1) 0.91% 0.08% 2.68*** 
(-20,1) 0.73% 0.03% 1.59 
(-20,5) 0.47% 0.02% 0.94 
***Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level 
 
 
Table 6. Analysis of the statistical significance of average CARs obtained by Family 
Businesses and Non-Family Businesses, for different short-term windows  
 (1) FB (N=87) (2) Non-FB (N=294) 
(3)=(2)-(1) Difference 
FB – Non-FB 
Event Period CAR t-stat CAR t-stat CAR t-stat 
t=0 0.02% 0.09 0.53% 4.96*** -0.51% -2.20** 
(-1,+1) 0.76% 2.06** 0.96% 5.14*** -0.20% -0.49 
(-2,+2) 0.87% 1.84* 0.92% 3.85*** -0.05% -0.10 
(-5,+5) 0.30% 0.43 1.06% 2.99*** -0.76% -0.98 
(-1,0) 0.42% 1.39 0.70% 4.58*** -0.28% -0.84 
(-3,0) 0.51% 1.20 0.75% 3.48*** -0.24% -0.50 
(-5,0) 0.38% 0.74 1.02% 3.86*** -0.63% -1.10 
(-5,1) 0.72% 1.28 1.28% 4.49*** -0.55% -0.89 
(-10,1) 0.27% 0.37 1.10% 2.95*** -0.83% -1.02 
(-20,1) -0.26% -0.26 1.02% 2.02** -1.28% -1.16 
(-20,5) -0.68% -0.63 0.81% 1.48 -1.49% -1.25 





Table 7. Analysis of the statistical significance of average CARs obtained by all firms in the 
sample during Good Times and Bad Times, for different short-term windows  
 (4) Good Times (GT) (5) Bad Times (BT) 
(6)=(4)-(5) Difference 
GT – BT 
Event Period CAR t-stat CAR t-stat CAR t-stat 
t=0 0.45% 4.13*** 0.33% 1.45 0.12% 0.46 
(-1,+1) 0.87% 4.65*** 1.02% 2.58*** -0.14% -0.33 
(-2,+2) 0.97% 4.01*** 0.76% 1.49 0.21% 0.37 
(-5,+5) 1.06% 2.96*** 0.42% 0.55 0.65% 0.76 
(-1,0) 0.50% 3.29*** 0.98% 3.06*** -0.48% -1.33 
(-3,0) 0.50% 2.30** 1.23% 2.70*** -0.73% -1.42 
(-5,0) 0.76% 2.85*** 1.19% 2.14** -0.43% -0.69 
(-5,1) 1.12% 3.92*** 1.22% 2.03** -0.10% -0.15 
(-10,1) 0.62% 1.64 1.71% 2.17** -1.09% -1.23 
(-20,1) 0.22% 0.43 2.13% 2.00** -1.91% -1.59 
(-20,5) 0.16% 0.28 1.32% 1.14 -1.17% -0.89 
***Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level 
 
 
Table 8. Comparison of short-term M&A performance of FB and Non-FB under favourable 
economic conditions – Good Times 
GT (7) FB (8) Non-FB 
(9)=(7)-(8) Diff. FB – 
Non-FB in GT 
Event Period CAR t-stat CAR t-stat CAR t-stat 
t=0 0.28% 1.17 0.50% 4.30*** -0.22% -0.88 
(-1,+1) 1.19% 2.93*** 0.78% 3.88*** 0.41% 0.95 
(-2,+2) 1.69% 3.21*** 0.76% 2.92*** 0.93% 1.65* 
(-5,+5) 1.44% 1.85* 0.95% 2.48** 0.49% 0.59 
(-1,0) 0.65% 1.95* 0.46% 2.82*** 0.18% 0.52 
(-3,0) 0.97% 2.06** 0.36% 1.55 0.61% 1.21 
(-5,0) 1.06% 1.84* 0.67% 2.35** 0.39% 0.63 
(-5,1) 1.60% 2.58*** 0.98% 3.21*** 0.62% 0.93 
(-10,1) 0.76% 0.93 0.57% 1.43 0.18% 0.21 
(-20,1) -0.34% -0.31 0.38% 0.70 -0.72% -0.61 
(-20,5) -0.50% -0.42 0.35% 0.60 -0.85% -0.66 
***Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level 
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Table 9. Comparison of short-term M&A performance of FB and Non-FB in periods of 
economic downturn – Bad Times 
BT (10) FB (11) Non-FB 
(12)=(10)-(11) Diff. FB – 
Non-FB in BT 
Event Period CAR t-stat CAR t-stat CAR t-stat 
t=0 -0.70% -1.45 0.63% 2.34** -1.33% -2.34** 
(-1,+1) -0.45% -0.54 1.44% 3.10*** -1.89% -1.92* 
(-2,+2) -1.39% -1.30 1.38% 2.30** -2.77% -2.19** 
(-5,+5) -2.87% -1.81* 1.37% 1.54 -4.25% -2.26** 
(-1,0) -0.22% -0.32 1.33% 3.50*** -1.55% -1.93* 
(-3,0) -0.76% -0.79 1.80% 3.35*** -2.56% -2.26** 
(-5,0) -1.48% -1.26 1.97% 2.99*** -3.45% -2.48** 
(-5,1) -1.72% -1.35 2.08% 2.92*** -3.79% -2.53** 
(-10,1) -1.08% -0.65 2.52% 2.70*** -3.60% -1.83* 
(-20,1) -0.03% -0.01 2.76% 2.19** -2.79% -1.05 
(-20,5) -1.19% -0.49 2.05% 1.50 -3.24% -1.12 
***Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level 
 
 
Table 10. Analysis of the statistical significance of average CARs obtained by all firms in the 
sample, separated according to the origin of the legal system of the acquiring firm country 
 
(14) English  
(N=198) 
(15) French              
(N=42) 




Event Period CAR t-stat CAR t-stat CAR t-stat CAR t-stat 
t=0 0.56% 4.03*** 0.07% 0.38 0.68% 2.32** 0.30% 1.01 
(-1,+1) 1.11% 4.65*** 0.51% 1.57 1.93% 3.79*** -0.08% -0.17 
(-2,+2) 1.28% 4.17*** 0.34% 0.81 2.17% 3.30*** -0.72% -1.09 
(-5,+5) 1.17% 2.56** 0.68% 1.10 2.63% 2.70*** -1.63% -1.68* 
(-1,0) 0.77% 3.96*** 0.20% 0.78 1.22% 2.94*** 0.39% 0.95 
(-3,0) 0.85% 3.07*** 0.30% 0.81 1.56% 2.65*** 0.03% 0.05 
(-5,0) 1.15% 3.41*** 0.38% 0.83 1.78% 2.47** -0.18% -0.25 
(-5,1) 1.49% 4.09*** 0.68% 1.38 2.49% 3.20*** -0.66% -0.85 
(-10,1) 1.04% 2.18** 0.82% 1.27 1.58% 1.55 -0.16% -0.15 
(-20,1) 1.25% 1.94* 0.57% 0.66 0.07% 0.05 -0.69% -0.50 
(-20,5) 0.93% 1.33 0.57% 0.60 0.22% 0.14 -1.66% -1.11 
***Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level 
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Table 11. Analysis of the statistical significance of average CARs obtained by Family 
Businesses, separated according to the origin of the legal system of the acquiring firm country 
 
(18) English      
(N=24) 
(19) French         
(N=16) 




Event Period CAR t-stat CAR t-stat CAR t-stat CAR t-stat 
t=0 0.70% 1.85* -0.44% -1.49 0.60% 0,97 -0.69% -1,38 
(-1,+1) 1.27% 1.95* -0.05% -0.11 3.73% 3,47*** -1.32% -1,53 
(-2,+2) 1.76% 2.10** -0.42% -0.64 4.93% 3,56*** -1.91% -1,71* 
(-5,+5) 0.98% 0.79 -0.69% -0.71 4.62% 2,25** -2.97% -1,79* 
(-1,0) 0.75% 1.42 -0.21% -0.51 1.95% 2,22** -0.39% -0,55 
(-3,0) 1.00% 1.33 -0.35% -0.60 2.89% 2,33** -0.89% -0,89 
(-5,0) 1.01% 1.10 -0.62% -0.86 3.10% 2,04** -1.29% -1,05 
(-5,1) 1.52% 1.53 -0.46% -0.60 4.88% 2,98*** -2.23% -1,68* 
(-10,1) 0.62% 0.47 0.03% 0.03 2.09% 0,97 -1.51% -0,87 
(-20,1) -0.32% -0.18 0.82% 0.60 -0.03% -0,01 -2.29% -0,98 
(-20,5) -0.86% -0.45 0.59% 0.40 -0.29% -0,09 -3.04% -1,19 
***Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level 
 
 
Table 12. Analysis of the statistical significance of average CARs obtained by Non-Family 
Businesses, separated according to the origin of the legal system of the acquiring firm country 
 
(22) English  
(N=174) 
(23) French  
(N=26) 




Event Period CAR t-stat CAR t-stat CAR t-stat CAR t-stat 
t=0 0.54% 3.56*** 0.29% 1.35 0.73% 2.49** 0.94% 3.26*** 
(-1,+1) 1.09% 4.17*** 0.75% 1.99** 0.83% 1.62 0.73% 1.45 
(-2,+2) 1.22% 3.62*** 0.67% 1.38 0.48% 0.73 0.07% 0.11 
(-5,+5) 1.20% 2.40** 1.28% 1.78* 1.41% 1.45 -0.75% -0.78 
(-1,0) 0.77% 3.63*** 0.39% 1.26 0.78% 1.87* 0.90% 2.21** 
(-3,0) 0.83% 2.75*** 0.59% 1.35 0.74% 1.27 0.63% 1.09 
(-5,0) 1.17% 3.17*** 0.82% 1.53 0.97% 1.34 0.55% 0.77 
(-5,1) 1.49% 3.73*** 1.18% 2.05** 1.02% 1.31 0.37% 0.48 
(-10,1) 1.10% 2.11** 1.17% 1.54 1.27% 1.25 0.73% 0.73 
(-20,1) 1.47% 2.08** 0.47% 0.45 0.13% 0.10 0.35% 0.26 
(-20,5) 1.18% 1.54 0.57% 0.51 0.53% 0.35 -0.77% -0.52 
***Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level 
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Table 13. Evaluation of the statistical difference in the performance of FB and Non-FB under 
different institutional backgrounds, separated according to the origin of the legal system of the 
acquiring firm country 
 (26)=(18)-(22) English (27)=(19)-(23) French (28)=(20)-(24) German 
(29)=(21)-(25) 
Scandinavian 
Event Period CAR t-stat CAR t-stat CAR t-stat CAR t-stat 
t=0 0.16% 0.39 -0.73% -2.16** -0.13% -0.18 -1.63% -3.17*** 
(-1,+1) 0.18% 0.25 -0.81% -1.38 2.90% 2.42** -2.05% -2.30** 
(-2,+2) 0.54% 0.59 -1.09% -1.44 4.45% 2.87*** -1.98% -1.72* 
(-5,+5) -0.22% -0.16 -1.97% -1.76* 3.21% 1.40 -2.22% -1.30 
(-1,0) -0.02% -0.04 -0.60% -1.25 1.17% 1.20 -1.29% -1.77* 
(-3,0) 0.17% 0.21 -0.94% -1.39 2.14% 1.55 -1.52% -1.48 
(-5,0) -0.16% -0.16 -1.43% -1.73* 2.13% 1.26 -1.83% -1.46 
(-5,1) 0.04% 0.03 -1.64% -1.84* 3.86% 2.11** -2.59% -1.91* 
(-10,1) -0.48% -0.34 -1.13% -0.97 0.82% 0.34 -2.24% -1.26 
(-20,1) -1.78% -0.93 0.35% 0.22 -0.16% -0.05 -2.64% -1.10 
(-20,5) -2.04% -0.97 0.02% 0.01 -0.82% -0.23 -2.27% -0.87 
***Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level 
 
 
Table 14. Descriptive Statistics – Mean, Median, Maximum and Minimum of dependent, 
independent and control variables 
 Mean Median Min Max 
CAR (-1,+1) 0.91% 0.46% -18.42% 27.09% 
FB 0.23 0 0 1 
GOODTIMES 0.73 1 0 1 
ENGLISH 0.52 1 0 1 
FRENCH 0.26 0 0 1 
GERMAN 0.11 0 0 1 
SCANDINAVIAN 0.11 0 0 1 
ACCOUNTSTAND 71.12 71 62 83 
DV 4.63 4.58 2.30 6.89 
RATDVAMV 0.08 0.03 0.000 1.43 
CROSSBORDER 0.62 1 0 1 
TPUBLIC 0.21 0 0 1 
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Table 16. OLS regressions of 3-day CARs (window (-1,+1)) on family control, macroeconomic 
and institutional environment, and target firm and deal characteristics 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Coeff. t-stats(a) Coeff. t-stats(a) Coeff. t-stats(a) Coeff. t-stats(a) 
FB -0.0003 -0.07 0.0005 0.10 -0.0012 -0.20 0.0002 0.03 
GOODTIMES -0.0025 -0.49 -0.0051 -0.56 -0.0021 -0.39 -0.0031 -0.34 
ENGLISH 0.0211 2.51** 0.0212 2.42** 0.0200 2.32** 0.0203 2.28** 
FRENCH 0.0241 2.01** 0.0204 1.74* 0.0228 1.85* 0.0197 1.64 
GERMAN 0.0390 3.18*** 0.0391 3.11*** 0.0368 3.02*** 0.0369 2.94*** 
ACCOUNTSTAND 0.0013 1.96** 0.0011 1.71* 0.0012 1.87* 0.0011 1.66* 
DV -0.0023 -1.53 -0.0024 -1.52 -0.0019 -1.18 -0.0019 -1.19 
RATDVAMV 0.0458 2.33** 0.0440 2.27** 0.0463 2.35** 0.0443 2.28** 
TPUBLIC 0.0065 1.28 0.0063 1.25 0.0059 1.12 0.0057 1.08 
CROSSBORDER 0.0083 1.87* 0.0086 1.98** 0.0071 1.60 0.0072 1.64 
Intercept -0.1023  -0.0842  -0.1005  -0.0860  
     
YEARS NO YES NO YES 
INDUSTRIES NO NO YES YES 
     
R2 6.50% 9.40% 7.52% 10.37% 
Adjusted R2 3.97% 4.36% 2.65% 2.96% 
F-statistic(a) 2.03** 1.58* 1.23 1.27 
Prob > F 0.0297 0.0557 0,2301 0.1621 
***Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level 
(a) Robust statistics (i.e. corrected for the presence of heterogeneity) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
